
So, one of my friends got back to me on the Trust and Verify blog and said that after reading it, he felt a little dizzy. I thought I’d go back to basics and do a little cut-out-and-keep guide to the IAEA like I did for the CTBTO with that slightly crass frog analogy, especially as the IAEA is in the news a lot right now because of the Iranian talks and the addition of a new pitstop on the IAEA itinerary of fun places to visit in Iran.
Most of the mentions of the IAEA I hear in conversation go something along the lines of “you know, the IAEA, those nuclear dudes, the ones with Hans Blix and Iraq and he was all like ‘no, don’t invade yet cos we still need to do some inspecting and that’ and the US was all like ‘time’s up buddy, ship out’ and then the Iraq war happened and Hans Blix got fed to some sharks by Kim Jong-Il“, which I think is a pretty good identification of the agency.
The IAEA is an international organisation that has two main purposes: a) promote the use of nuclear technology for peaceful uses like energy and treating cancer and so on, and b) discouraging the use of said technology for making nuclear bombs. To do this, it has three main activities:
- Safeguards and verification: this means checking that governments are not diverting nuclear material or misusing technology to make nuclear warhead. This is the famous one that always gets in the news, especially re. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and Iran.
- Safety and security: helping governments to improve the safety of nuclear facilities (so as to prevent another Chernobyl) and security to protect them against criminal activity (this is where prevention of nuclear terrorism would fall)
- Technical cooperation: helping countries develop their civilian nuclear technology. This might include energy programmes, but not necessarily – it could also be for medical or agricultural uses.
Some stuff about Safeguards
While some people get frustrated at the limitations of the powers of the UN, the IAEA Safeguards inspectors are necessarily restricted. Firstly, you cannot have forced on-site inspections (the idea was mooted once in the early days of nonproliferation) because governments have to give consent to what’s happening on their territory. Secondly, they can only go in and inspect declared nuclear facilities – these are the ones that governments give their consent to be inspected. And thirdly, they cannot actually view nuclear weapons facilities because that would compromise national military secrets – they are only looking for evidence that suggests that civilian nuclear material and technology are being misused for military purposes.
Muahahaha! I’m a hypothetical evil dictator and I am thinking about developing a nuke and taking over the universe. What happens now?
Well, it would be a bit weird for a government to allow the IAEA to discover substantial proof of a nuclear weapons programme, so suspicions would be aroused by a government being unhelpful to the extent that IAEA inspectors are unable to verify that there is no diversion of nuclear material (slightly too many negatives there!). This is called non-compliance, and while what exactly non-compliance means is a little ill-defined, the IAEA has found non-compliance five times so far. If this kind of stuff interests you, there’s more on it here. The Board of the IAEA then asks the non-compliant country to pull its socks up and reports non-compliance to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council.
That’s all they can do, report me?
I think Hans Blix’s comments on being fed to sharks are helpful in answering this question. The IAEA is the only agency that reports directly to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council (all the other ones have to report to the UN Economic and Social Council). If the Security Council thinks that what it’s hearing has an impact on international peace and security, they do whatever ass-kicking it is the Security Council does, like sanctions and the like. The IAEA itself can stop or suspend technical assistance to the non-compliant government and ask for its stuff back (materials, technology, etc).
Why should we care about this?
The IAEA is part of a nuclear nonproliferation effort that has been remarkably effective in preventing proliferation considering that proliferation estimates in the 1950s predicted as many as 30 nuclear weapons states. Aside from the fact that we do all need someone to go into countries running nuclear programmes and check nothing weird is going on, the interactions of governments with the IAEA and Safeguards are telling about their attitudes towards nonproliferation and weapons, and about their positioning in international politics. Of course, the system is not without many limits, and one continuing question for the international community is how to manage countries who stay outside the mainsteam nonproliferation system and don’t have a Safeguards agreement.






